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AIRLINE MERGERS
IN THE 1970's
JOHN

H.

CROOKER, JR.*

Recently, a number of airlines have sought to increase their
share in the market and improve their financial position through
mergers. In the following article Mr. John Crooker examines the
position that the Civil Aeronautics Board has taken concerning
mergers involving both the failing carrier and the healthy, certificated carrier. His analysis includes predictions of future Board
responses to similar situations and predictions of other types of
mergers that may possibly be proposed.

T

HE designation of a new CAB Chairman is sometimes followed
by speculation as to whether his "philosophy" (concerning
routes, rates, subsidy or mergers) will provide new leadership in
crystallizing the views of other Board members on those topics.
With the designation of Robert Timm as Chairman,1 it is of particular interest at this time to consider the position the Board may
take regarding mergers or acquisitions that may be proposed in
the years just ahead. Therefore, a review of recent merger and
acquisition cases seems timely. Two factors might be kept in mind,
however, in looking at these recent decisions: first, it appears that
two new members will come to the Board, one to succeed former
Chairman Secor Browne' and the other to succeed Member Robert
Murphy;3 secondly, Mr. Timm, prior to becoming Chairman, set
* B.A., Rice University, LL.B., University of Texas School of Law. Attorney-

at-Law, Houston, Texas. Mr. Crooker is past Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, serving in that capacity from 1968-69.
1Designated February 26, 1973, effective March 2, 1973. See 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 192 (1973).
2Resignation noted in 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
192 (1973).
3 The President sent to the Senate on March 12, 1973, the name of Judge Lee
R. West of Oklahoma to succeed Mr. Murphy. 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 251 (1973).
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forth his interpretation of Section 408" in his vigorous and articulate
dissent in the American-Western Merger Case:' Hence, the welding
of some "new majority" in the area of proposed future mergers

may be likely. Happily, from the standpoint of a person commenting on the Board's position in recent merger cases, there are

no major cases in this area pending,' so that any thoughts expressed clearly do not relate to any pending proceeding.
I.

THE FAILING CARRIER CASES

During the early part of the 1970's, the Board handed down
decisions in Section 408 cases pertaining to four air carriers that
had sustained significant financial losses,-Trans Caribbean, Caribair, Mohawk and Northeast.' In each instance except Caribair,
the majority followed a course of action to "prevent the demise"
of an ailing carrier. A quick look at the American-Trans Caribbean
Merger Case,' decided in December, 1970, is helpful as background
to the steps taken in the Eastern-Caribaircase. The Board (with
only Member Murphy dissenting on the question of "tacking" of
route authority of the two carriers) unanimously approved the
merger, following largely the reasoning of the Examiner ' in his
recommended opinion, concluding that "the merger will prevent
449 U. S. C. § 1378 (1964). References herein are to sections of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, as amended 49 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
1 CAB Docket No. 22916; CAB Orders Nos. 72-7-91 (June 13, 1972), 72-7-92
(June 13, 1972) (approved by the President, June 26, 1972).
' The proposed Eastern acquisition of Caribair had not, as of the time of
initial preparation of this article (late March, 1973) been finally decided. However, on April 11, 1973, a final decision was reached in which the President
directed the Board to approve the merger in accordance with the view of the
dissenting Board members. See note 87 infra, and text accompanying.
7
American-TransCaribbean Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 21828, CAB
Order No. 70-12-161. (December 18, 1970) (approved by the President, December 31, 1970); Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.-Eastern Airlines, Inc. Acquisition
Case, CAB Docket No. 22690, CAB Order No. 73-4-80 (April 11, 1973) (approved by the President, April 19, 1973); Allegheny-Mohawk Merger Case, CAB
Docket No. 23371, CAB Orders Nos. 72-4-31 (March 28, 1972), 72-4-32 (March
28, 1972) (approved by the President, April 6, 1972); and Delta-Northeast
Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 23315, CAB Orders Nos. 72-5-73 (April 24,
1972), 72-5-74 (April 24, 1972) (approved by the President, May 19, 1972).
8 CAB Docket No. 21828, CAB Order No. 70-12-161 (December 18, 1970)
(approved by the President, December 31, 1970).
9Effective August 17, 1972, the title "Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law Judge." 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972). Most of the decisions treated
in this article referred to hearings before "Examiners," and it should be understood that the two titles are used interchangeably.
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the demise"'" of Trans Caribbean. A discussion of beneficial results which spring from most mergers followed: i.e., traffic integration; improved use of flight equipment and personnel; cost
savings from superior aircraft maintenance and traffic service
operations; and the elimination of duplicate terminal and other
facilities."
In its opinion, the Board fully treated the matter of estimated
diversion from other carriers, especially as a result of "tacking."
Two policies were reiterated:
(i) A merged carrier's ability to "tack" routes is a "natural,
inherent concomitant of the transaction;" and the public
should not be denied the benefits therefrom "absent a strong
showing that a restriction is needed in order to protect other
carriers."
(ii) The Board may stay a merged carrier's authorization to
operate any transferred route, pending completion of 401 (g)
proceedings instituted to consider whether the authorization
should be deleted from the transferred certificate, but that
power should be exercised only in "unusual circumstances."
In rejecting the contentions (principally by Pan American but
also by Eastern) with respect to probable diversion, the Board
pointed out that recent route awards to Trans Caribbean had been
made not solely with the view of carrier strengthening but also
because the incumbent carriers in the Caribbean area had not aggressively exploited their certificate rights.
In this case, the Board passed on one collateral issue on its own
initiative, making its approval subject to one rather interesting
"non-route" condition-the elimination of agreements requiring
American to employ Mr. Roy Chalk (Trans Caribbean's largest
shareholder) and seven other Trans Caribbean officers. Mr. Chalk's
agreement provided that he be paid an annual salary of $40,000
for eighty days of work per year for seven years; and if American
requested that he render additional consulting services, he would
receive an additional $500 per day. The evidence reflected that
American had never before entered into similar employment contracts at comparable salaries for "consulting services;"'" and it was
"0See CAB Order No. 70-12-161, supra note 8, at 2.
"Id. at 2, 3.
'Id. at 10.
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apparently undisputed that no specific task or position had been
earmarked for any of the Trans Caribbean officers. The Board
observed that employment contracts may provide a means for
majority shareholders to enjoy a special financial advantage to the
detriment of minority shareholders. As the applicants failed to
establish that the employment contracts were necessary or advantageous to the surviving carrier, it was concluded that the public
interest required that the contracts not be tied to the merger agreement. American was not prohibited from engaging the services of
Mr. Chalk or any of the others; the decision simply left American
free to negotiate any such employment, outside the ambit of the
merger agreement.
About three weeks before the Board's decision in AmericanTrans Caribbean, the Board approved the Interim Management
Arrangement applied for jointly by Eastern and Caribair in connection with their proposed merger.1" Within the first half of
calendar 1971, the Examiner's recommended decision, favoring
the acquisition of Caribair by Eastern, was handed down; and oral
argument was held before the Board. Thereafter, although Eastern
pumped financial support into Caribair," matters did not move
quickly. More than a year passed; and the continuing losses of
Pan American had become a matter of great concern. The plight
of Caribair was probably worse in mid-1972 than had been true
of Trans Caribbean in late 1970, even though Eastern's financial
assistance to it had been some five times as great as the amount
originally committed. But the Board majority, in its August 3, 1972,
opinion sent to the White House 5 cited two basic reasons for
coming to a conclusion (contrary to that reached by the Examiner)
that (i) approval would overturn nearly 30 years of "historical
11CAB

Order No. 70-11-142 (November 27, 1970). The agreement was sub-

sequently extended for three months by CAB Order No. 71-6-145 (June 29,
1971), thereafter from month to month by a series of orders, e.g., CAB Order
No. 71-12-5 (December 1, 1971); CAB Order No. 72-3-115 (March 31, 1972).
'4

Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.-Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Acquisition Case,

CAB Docket No. 22690, CAB Order No. 73-4-80 (April 11, 1973)

(dissenting

opinion of August 3, 1972 at 18). Eastern's original commitment had been for
$1,000,000. While the exact amount actually advanced to Caribair by its creditors
is uncertain, it was said by Vice Chairman Gilliland and Member Minetti in their
dissent that Caribair's creditors "would be some millions of dollars better off if
the Eastern acquisition agreement were approved ...

"

The Board majority did

not disagree on this point.
5 Id. (opinion of August 3, 1972, was not signed by the President).
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development in the Caribbean that has lead to the present U.S.Caribbean route structure;"' " and (ii) Eastern's acquisition of
Caribair "would divert substantial revenues from Pan American,
disturbingly
a particularly unfortunate circumstance in view of the
17
high losses that Pan American has been suffering."
In a thorough dissent, Vice Chairman Gillilland and Member
Minetti effectively answered the first point. They pointed out that
such a result would terminate "all U.S.-flag certificated service in
numerous intra-Caribbean markets-markets in which certificated
services [had] heretofore been found required by the public convenience and necessity. 8 The dissenters also believed that the
adverse consequences to Pan American would not be severe, pointing out:
(i) If Eastern acquired Caribair's route and operated the service
as it then proposed to do, Pan American's 1972 traffic in
those markets would be greater than its actual 1969 traffic;
(ii) The bulk of the diversion feared by Pan American could
be averted by imposing suitable conditions on the transfer of
Caribair's route authority, without materially impairing Eastern's plans for utilizing that authority;" and
(iii) Some bit of "diversion" from Pan American existed because
of other decisions (e.g. the American-Trans Caribbean
matter) and not solely from approval of the proposed
Eastern-Caribair agreement.
The real crux of the difference of viewpoint between the majority view and the minority view related to the effect of the
anticipated traffic diversion on Pan American. In several cases
coming to the Board during the preceding few years, (e.g., the
merger of three local service carriers to form Air West," and the
Hughes acquisition of Air West") much had been said about the
"failing business doctrine." Except in the Caribair situation, the
only entities deemed to be in dire financial straits were carriers
11 d. at 2 (opinion of August 3, 1972).
Id. at 3 (opinion of August 3, 1972).
8
M at 1 (dissenting opinion of August 3, 1972).
1d.
Mid.at 3 (dissenting opinion of August 3, 1972).
1
Bonanza-Pacitic-West Coast Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 18996, CAB
Order No. E-26625 (approved April 9, 1968).
" Acquisition of Air West by Hughes Tool Co., CAB Docket No. 20665,
CAB Orders Nos. 69-7-102 (July 15, 1969), 69-7-103 (July 15, 1969) (approved
by the President).
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proposed to be merged or acquired; but here there is a genuine
concern for the ability of a third party carrier (and a very large
one, at that) to survive, should the proposed acquisition be approved.
The Board majority in Eastern-Caribairfound that: "For the
three years ended December 31, 1971, Pan American suffered a
system-wide loss of about $120,000,000, ' ' 2 and that for 1969 and
1970, "most of the loss" had occurred in the Caribbean. Further,
it was deemed that "the net result could easily be a serious competitive disadvantage for Pan American that it could ill afford
at this stage in its history;" and that "in all likelihood the disadvantage would be permanent and ever-increasing as the mainland
interior traffic available to Eastern built up. .. ."
In the dissenting opinion, four pages" were devoted to the affirmative public benefits of approval of the proposed agreementfactors such as those cited in the American-Trans Caribbean case.
But both at the Board and at the White House, the focal question
continued to be whether utilization of Caribair's route authority by
Eastern would deal a staggering blow to Pan American.
The President returned the Board's August 3, 1972, opinion
unsigned. In his letter, the President aptly summarized the two
important foreign policy considerations involved in the case: that
U.S.-flag carriers remain in a healthy financial condition; and that
U.S.-flag certificated service to non-U.S. points in the Caribbean be
maintained. He stated that he returned the opinion unsigned because it did not consider (as an alternative) "detailed restrictions
to mitigate the diversionary impact on Pan American revenues if
the acquisition were approved." He urged the Board "to make the
necessary studies to investigate such restrictions and to consider
whether such restrictions could satisfy both the Board's objectives
and the President's foreign policy concerns.25
By CAB Order 72-10-96, statements of views and replies thereto
on the issues raised by the President's letter were invited and a
22 Caribbean-Atlantic
Airlines, Inc.-Eastern Airlines, Inc. Acquisition Case,
CAB Docket No. 22690, CAB Order No. 73-4-80, at 12 (August 3, 1972) (not
approved by the President).
23 Id. at 16.
24 ld. at 19-22 (dissenting opinion of August 3, 1972).
15The President's disapproval of the Board's decision was announced in CAB
Order 72-10-96 (October 30, 1972).
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time frame was fixed for receipt of the same during the month of
November 1972. Subsequently, there has been considerable speculation in the trade press that another decision has been reached
and has been sent to the White House." Apparently, while Eastern
terminated its financial support to Caribair, its management services continued; and necessary funds have been supplied (apparently
largely from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) to prevent the
death of Caribair.
As noted, the President's action in Caribair (which in effect
remanded the case to the Board) succinctly set forth the view that
in such matters, a major part of the "diversionary impact" on a
third carrier may be averted if the Board considers "detailed restrictions" on utilization of some of the route authority of the
to-be-absorbed carrier. Favorable resolution of a merger application by imposing such restrictions was receiving attention at the
Board at substantially the same time, in the Northwest-Northeast
case.'
A merger agreement between Northeast and Northwest had
been submitted for approval, approval was granted subject to one
condition of great importance to Northwest--denying to the surviving carrier (Northwest) the Miami-Los Angeles authority
granted to Northeast in the Southern Tier case." Northwest was
unwilling to live with the proposed merger without gaining MiamiLos Angeles authority as part of the package, and Northeast sought
another marriage. The position of Delta was somewhat different,
since it had been utilizing Florida-California authority since the
Southern Transcontinental case," decided more than a decade
earlier. While it actively sought the Miami-Los Angeles route,
Delta agreed to proceed with the merger should the Board stay
the authority granted to Northeast in Southern Tier.'
The "failing business doctrine" (this time applied to Northeast)
was in the forefront of the Board's thoughts. On the second page of
2

1See

27

AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 11, 1973; Feb. 15, 1973; Feb. 22, 1973.

Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 21819, CAB Orders
Nos. 70-12-162 (December 22, 1970), 70-12-163 (December 22, 1970), 71-3-8
(March 1, 1971) (on reconsideration).
28
Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, CAB Docket No. 18257,
CAB Order No. 69-7-135 (July 24, 1969).
29 Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701 (1961).
3oSee note 28 supra.
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the opinion, the Board pointed out that the "proceeding represents the second time in a little more than a year in which the
Board has been asked to consider a merger of Northeast Airlines
with another air carrier.""1 Comment was made at the time of the
Northwest-Northeast proceeding that "while Northeast was not in
extremis, and could reduce its losses through retrenchment, its
financial condition was precarious, and its prospects for the future
were bleak."" The Board then set forth a series of financial statistics which unquestionably spelled bankruptcy for Northeast, if
approval to merge was not forthcoming. The 1970 Northeast loss
had been nearly eleven million dollars (despite windfall traffic
picked up as a result of a strike of a competitor) and the 1971
loss appeared to be $13,922,000. The negative shareholder equity
(excess of debts over assets) by the end of 1971 was approaching
the $47 million mark. Revenues were falling far short of meeting
operating expenses less depreciation and amortization. While Storer
Broadcasting Company had, to that time, provided most of the
needed cash, its Board of Directors had determined to end the
financial assistance to Northeast (and thus to "get back to running" a broadcasting business, with which it was felt their corporate
officers had reasonable familiarity and competence).
While the Board considered route strengthening as a solution to
the carrier's dilemma, it was concluded that "Northeast simply
does not have the financial wherewithal to mount the effective
operation necessary to penetrate a new market and capture enough
traffic to make such an enterprise profitable."" And finally, viewing potential diversion in terms of growth offset, the Board agreed
with the projection by the Bureau of Operating Rights that there
would be "no diversion whatsoever."'" Objections had come from
Eastern and National, to the effect that such merger would prevent
them from obtaining the 12 percent rate of return goal established
in Phase 8 of the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation.' The
Board brushed aside this contention on both the facts and the
proper interpretation of the Phase 8 decision-stating that the

11Delta-Northeast Merger Case, CAB Docket No. 23315, CAB Orders Nos.
72-5-73 (May 19, 1972), 72-5-74 (March 19, 1972).
" id. at 2.
33Id. at 7.
4Id.

at 19.

1 Id. See also CAB Order No. 71-4-58 (April 9, 1971).
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record before it did not support the contention that over the long
run, Eastern or National would be thus prevented from attaining
that "rate of profit," and also pointing out that the 12 percent
figure is intended as an industry average over a period of years,
and guarantees nothing to any particular carrier or industry-wide
as to any particular year."
The Delta-Northeast merger was therefore approved. Procedurally, the authorization of Delta to operate segment 7 of Northeast's
certificate for route 27"' was stayed "pending final decision in a
proceeding instituted for the purpose of reexamination of such
authorization." The proceeding was to be instituted upon transfer
of the certificate. It will be recalled that in the American-Trans
Caribbean" case, the Board had found that the recent grant of
authority to Trans Caribbean had not been solely for the purpose
of carrier strengthening; but in the Southern Tier case, it was indisputable that there could have been no justifiable reason for the
award to Northeast except carrier strengthening. In the DeltaNortheast opinion, the Board expressed some displeasure at the
actions of Northeast's officers in connection with the matter. It
stated that "the [Miami-Los Angeles] award was based in part on
Northeast's assurances to the Board that its management contemplated that the carrier would remain an independent entity. As it
turned out, immediately after the award of the route, the carrier
began its quest to merge with another carrier. The sole basis for
the award was thus frustrated.""
On a final point with respect to this route, Delta urged that it
should be allowed to operate the route pending the outcome of the
401 (g) proceeding; the Department of Transportation supported
the request. After careful review of the pros and cons, the Board
concluded that "on balance" the reasons for ordering the 401 (g)
proceeding also required the Board to deny the request for pendente
lite authority. '
On one other point collateral to the main question of merger
vel non, considerable concern was expressed about the intentions
"See note 31 supra at 20.
'7While this segment has been referred to as Miami-Los Angeles, technically it
is Miami/Ft. Lauderdale, Florida-Los Angeles/Ontario/Long Beach, California.
"'See note 8 supra.

"See note 31 supra.
40Id.at 29-30.
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of the surviving carrier to provide the type and extent of service
which the Board had originally envisioned Northeast would provide to the New England area. Member Murphy dissented, principally because Delta had, some six weeks before the Board's
decision, filed a "service proposal" 1 proposing to delete from its
post-merger certificate some two-thirds of the New England area
cities certificated to Northeast. He favored reopening the record
in the merger case to take evidence upon the service proposal.'
In arguing for remanding "the case to the Examiner to take evidence on Delta's proposal and to fully re-examine those proposals
of other carriers, such as Eastern, who have indicated that they
stand ready to serve this important area of the nation,"'' Member
Murphy commented that the Board "has had a long history of
trying to compel unwilling carriers to serve markets that they do
not wish to serve, and time and again has seen this unwillingness
translated into marginal service grudgingly rendered."" Member
Minetti commented that he did "not regard it as essential or
desirable to reopen the evidentiary record and remand the case
to the Examiner," pointing out that such course "would defer final
decision for many months or even years," but that he "would
reopen oral argument (which could be done immediately) in order
to permit the Board to question Delta's representative further concerning the carrier's intentions as to Northern New England servic e . "9
By coincidence, within a week after the filing of Delta's "service
proposal" affecting New England, the Board handed down its
decision in another merger case '4 -this one affecting two contiguous local service carriers whose route systems lay in the northeasterly quarter of the continental United States. All five of the
Board members agreed that the merger of Allegheny and Mohawk
should be approved."' The reasons for the result were not complex:
(i) the two carriers had 18 stations in common; (ii) the merger
CAB Docket No. 24306 (filed March 14, 1972).
See note 31 supra at 1 (dissenting opinion).
4
1 Id. at 3.
41
4

4Id.

Id. at 1 (statement of Minetti).
CAB Orders Nos. 72-4-31 (1972), 72-4-32 (1972).
47 Id.
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would result in discontinuance of competitive service in only two
markets;, 8 (iii) no air carrier intervenor opposed approval; (iv) no
air carrier intervenor submitted an estimate of diversion or contended that it would be jeopardized by approval of the merger;
and (v) the Board affirmatively found no factual evidence of diversion from any other air carrier. Members Minetti and Murphy
concurred in the principal result, but advocated changes in the
labor protective provisions. Since these provisions constituted the
only point of disagreement among the members in this case, a look
at the suggestions made by the dissenters is warranted. Specifically,
they advocated the institution of a new proceeding, in the nature
of rulemaking, to consider for the future what if any substantive
changes should be made in the labor protective provisions. In this
writer's opinion, Members Minetti and Murphy had a valid point
in observing that proposals for changes in labor protective provisions always come before the Board for consideration "as a peripheral issue in individual merger and route transfer cases, and tend
to be overshadowed by the major issues of whether the merger
or transfer shall be approved as being in the public interest."' In
the United-Capital case,"0 careful consideration was given to the
labor protective provisions; and for some years, the Board has
more or less adopted these provisions by reference, unless some
specific need existed to modify the conditions in a particular case.
If a majority of the members of the Board, as it will exist in the
latter part of 1973, should determine that substantial changes
should now be made in the rather "standardized" labor protective
provisions set out in United-Capital, then a proceeding might be
instituted as proposed by Messrs. Minetti and Murphy. At all
events, the Board should determine what labor protective provisions might now be considered as the "standardized" ones, so that
ad hoc decisions on the labor points would not confront the Board
in cases that are often laden with more pressing issues and when
consideration is (as argued by the two dissenting members in the
Allegheny-Mohawk case) "surrounded by an aura of urgency and
haste." After all, certain phases of the Domestic Passenger-Fare
41

Erie-Detroit and Islip-Bridgeport.

41See note 46 supra at 5 (concurring opinion).

"United

Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307 (1961).
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Investigation
were approached in substantially the same procedural
1
way.'
Are there conclusions which may be easily summarized from the
four "sick carrier" 408 cases of the early 1970's? Subject to broad
generalities that neglect to pinpoint conditions, variations and
exceptions, it appears that in future matters of this sort, the Board's
determinations will emphasize:
(i) That merger (even with modified service proposals) furnishes more protection to the public against loss of certificated services previously found to be needed, than does
dismemberment of a carrier;
(ii) Careful examination of proposals for curtailed service after
approval of a merger;
(iii) Assistance in the salvage of creditor (or even shareholder)
interests; and preventing wholesale discharge of a company's employees;
(iv) Appraisal of affirmative benefits from traffic integration,
elimination of duplicate services and facilities, etc.;
(v) Cancellation of "sweetheart contracts" with highly-paid
executives for future "services" in merger agreements;
(vi) Possible standardization of the labor protective provisions;
(vii) Application of a "growth offset" rather than a "percent of
market" yardstick to the potential diversion question;
(viii) Treatment of a merged carrier's ability to "tack" as natural
and inherent, but remaining ready to review in a 401(g)
proceeding the question of deleting specific authorization
from the transferred certificate;
(ix) Determination on an ad hoc basis whether to permit pendente lite utilization of authority being considered in such
a 401(g) proceeding; but probably "on balance" staying
most of such questioned authority until a final determination.
In addition to the specifics set forth above, it is submitted that the
Board will continue to be acutely aware of the fact that a decline
in investor confidence in airline securities would attend the "de-

"' See note 33 supra. The Phases of the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation
which were handled by rulemaking are as follows:
a. Treatment of Flight Equipment Depreciation and Residual Values for Rate
Purposes-Phase 1, P.S.D.R. 45, April 9, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 7225 (April 16,

1971).
b. Treatment of Leased Aircraft for Rate Purposes-Phase 2, P.S.D.R. 44,
April 9, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 7228 (April 16, 1971).
c. Treatment of Deferred Federal Income Taxes for Rate Purposes-Phase 3,
P.S.D.R. 46, April 9, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 7230 (April 16, 1971).
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mise" of any certificated scheduled air carrier. Lest one conclude
that this final factor pre-determines every merger case involving a
debilitated scheduled carrier, it must be remembered that a careful
review of the economics applicable to third party carriers must also
be considered-and the larger and more prestigious the carrier in
financial straits, the more the concern over its vitality will exist.
II. MERGER OF HEALTHY CARRIERS
The four cases discussed above were all considered in the light
of the "failing business doctrine." What about a proposed merger
of two healthy carriers? American Airlines and Western Airlines
presented such a situation. Scant attention was given in the four

cases to the fact that the wording of Section 408 of the Act is cast
differently than the wording of Section 401. But in the AmericanWestern Merger Case," the Board majority felt constrained to
discuss the "burden of proof" differences in the wording of Sections
401 and 408; and a principal thrust of the dissent by Chairman
Timm' involved this distinction.
The Examiner had recommended disapproval of the merger

(and the attendant proposed transfer of Western's certificates to
American, as the surviving carrier) as inconsistent with the public
interest upon findings that the merger would disrupt the size and

balance relationship that must be maintained as between the large
trunk carriers; that the merger would not result in any material
public benefits or meet any serious transportation need; and that
the merger would seriously disrupt the structure of the air transportation system, especially in the mainland-Hawaii markets.
The impact on other carriers in the mainland-Hawaii markets
was a prominent factor in the decision in American-Western, just
as the impact on Pan American was considered by the Board in
Eastern-Caribair.Pages 4 through 16 of the Board's decision were
devoted almost in their entirety to arithmetic. The Board found
that the mainland-Hawaii operations would account for about
52 percent of the total added revenues attributed to the merger;
-CAB

Docket No. 22916, CAB Orders Nos. 72-7-91 (June 13, 1972), 72-

7-92 (June 13, 1972) (approved by the President, July 26, 1972).

11 At the time of the decisions here referred to, Mr. Timm was a Member of
the Board, but in view of his subsequent designation as Chairman, he is referred
to in this article as Chairman Timm.
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and that $65 million annually of diversion from other carriers
would occur in those markets."
The Board took note of the fact that before 1969, only three
U. S. carriers had mainland-Hawaii authority, and two of them
(United and Pan American) carried nearly 95 percent of the
traffic. Before 1969, the last major change in Transpacific authority
(granting West Coast-Hawaii route authority to United) had occurred some two decades earlier,-a decade before the advent of
the jet airliner. So in Transpac, the Board had provided Western
and Continental with significant mainland-Hawaii authority and
had granted Braniff authority from five Southern cities, overflying
the West Coast. These three carriers (and Northeast) were the
trunk carriers not then having transcontinental authority. Further
in Transpac, both TWA and American had been awarded Hawaii
authority with significant long-haul restrictions.
In its opinion in the American-Western case, the Board noted:
[T]he possibility of disruption in mainland-Hawaii operations becomes particularly serious to us when we review the balance of
carrier competition in these markets which the Board specifically
patterned only three years ago in the Transpacific Route Investigation. Because of the Board's action, these markets differ from
other markets where the competitive relationships have arisen on
a piecemeal basis, or where traffic growth is so great as to transcend
the pattern established by previous Board route awards. In such
other markets the alteration of the system by a merger might,
therefore, be only one of many factors bearing on the resulting
competitive route structure."s
Again alluding to the delicate nature of the competitive balance
sought to be established in Transpac, it was said: "The resultant
structure provided competitive Hawaiian service from all but one
of the twenty-four mainland coterminals involved."" Further it
was said:
In implementing this balance the Board selected carriers and
imposed restrictions, in a manner intended to provide a reasonable
opportunity for profitable operations after an initial development
period, to encourage nonstop operations from interior mainland
points, and to strengthen weak carriers whose route systems re"See note 52 supra at 4-5 (majority opinion).
'Id. at 5.
51 New Orleans.
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quired strengthening. Subsequent Presidential directives in the
international phase of the case required deletion of an international
Central Pacific route for American, and substitution of American
for Continental in the international South Pacific route via Hawaii.
The Board thereupon, in the domestic phase of the case, made
corresponding alterations in its domestic route awards in order to
maintain the competitive balance."
The Board seriously considered whether the imposition of restrictions or nontransfer conditions could resolve the mainlandHawaii market problem. As stated in the opinion: "In the first
place, American has taken the position that it would not proceed
with the merger in the event of the imposition of conditions or
restrictions on transfer of California-Hawaii authority." 8 The Board,
having fresh in its mind the fulfillment of a similar statement of
position by Northwest in its proposed merger with Northeast, was
doubtless persuaded that American meant business. But the Board
pursued the matter another step, and concluded that even if
American would accept such a condition, there was no acceptable
alternative to disapproval. American proposed a capacity limitation
as had been approved in Order 71-8-9l."' The Board pointed out,
however, that "such agreements have not generally been sanctioned
under the Federal Aviation Act because of their anti-competitive
nature." The August 1971 approval of one year capacity limitation agreements in four markets had been "a temporary expedient
to resolve a financially ruinous but short-term problem of overcapacity."'" So the Board concluded that "[a] permanent problem
cannot be solved permanently by a temporary expedient." 2 Finally,
in considering possible alternatives, the Board explored the possibility that the merged carrier's Hawaii operations might be re"7See

note 52 supra at 6.

CAB Order No. 72-7-9 1, at 21 (June 13, 1972).
19In the Matter of the Application by Trans World Airlines, Inc. For Approval
of Capacity Agreement, CAB Order No. 71-8-91 (August 19, 1971). The four
East Coast-West Coast markets in which approval was given to engage in discussions as to limiting capacities were:
New York/Newark-Los Angeles,
New York/Newark-San Francisco,
5

Chicago-San Francisco, and

Washington/Baltimore-Los Angeles.
0 CAB Order No. 72-7-91, at 21 (June 13, 1972).
" See note 52 supra at 21.
8
2 Id. at 21.
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stricted to those which could have been performed separately by
the two carriers under their existing route authority; but the Board
rejected this solution because such a restriction would "create a
series of cumbersome limitations within the merged carrier's route
system, which is generally undesirable" and because such a restriction would not avoid giving
to the merged carrier "a disruptive
' 3'
9
advantage.
competitive
In Chairman Timm's dissent, he expressed the view that "the
majority rested its decision almost entirely on the competitive disruption an unconditional approval would cause in the mainlandHawaii markets. '"' He then listed some of the identifiable benefits
from most proposed mergers: e.g., the two systems would integrate
well (which fact was not disputed); industry balance has nothing
to do with size; efficiencies would be obtained in "aircraft utilization, reduction of personnel and staff, duplicate facility rentals,
computer investment, advertising, reduced spares inventory, insurance savings and flight training savings."'"
While the economic differences of viewpoint between Chairman
Timm and the other members participating in the case are important, their significant difference in legal philosophy related to
the proper interpretation to be given to the wording of Section
408 (b)." This statute requires any person seeking approval of a
consolidation, merger, etc., to present an application to the Board,
and that notice shall be given of the time and place of a public
hearing. It then provides:
Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds that the consolidation,
merger ... will not be consistent with the public interest or that
the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order
approve such consolidation, merger . . . Provided that the Board
shall not approve any consolidation, merger . . . which would
result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain
competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the
consolidation, merger ....
Neither the majority in the American-Western case nor Chairman Timm felt that the decision turned on the question of whether
3

I at 22.
1d.

Id. at 13 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 16 (dissenting opinion).
U.S.C. § 1378 (1970).
"I Id. (emphasis added).
6849
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the merger "would result in creating a monopoly that would thereby
restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier, within the
intent of Section 408(b). So the difference centered on the question of whether the Board must, by order, approve the merger
unless there is a finding that such merger would be inconsistent
with the public interest. In Chairman Timm's dissent, he noted
that the phrase "consistent with the public interest" has raised a
controversy over what happens when there is a proposed merger
with no outstanding public benefits and no outstanding public
detriments, i.e., an exactly even balance between pros and cons.'
A clear distinction was noted between the wording of Section
408(b) and Section 401 (d)." There is plainly an affirmative
burden of proof to be borne by an applicant in order to obtain a
certificate; but Chairman Timm persuasively asserts that in that
hypothetical case in which the scales are tipped neither way, normal
rules of statutory construction would compel the conclusion that:
Congress intended the Board to approve mergers between air
carriers so long as the result would not be adverse to the public
interest. A merger of two air carriers which did not promote the
public interest would have to be approved by the Board under the
Act unless the Board specifically found that the merger would be
adverse to the public interest."
The proposed American-Western merger is a thing of the past.
But in the realm of speculation as to future decisions in 408 (b)
cases, strict construction of the subsection may emerge, and
the Board may conclude that its statutory charge is no more and
no less than what the plain statutory language would imply as to
what may be termed "burden of proof."
One additional point in Chairman Timm's dissent in AmericanWestern is noteworthy. He enunciated a policy with which no other
member disagreed that:
...bankruptcy is not a statutory condition precedent to merger.
There is no prohibition in the Act against two healthy carriers
merging. Economically sound carriers need not grow old, run down,
and die before a Board-approved merger can be triggered. Carriers
are statutorally entitled to the benefits of strengthening through
"See note 52 supra at 1 (dissenting opinion).
6849 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970).

" See note 52 supra at 2 (dissenting opinion).
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merger while they are healthy. If Congress had not intended this
to be the case, it would have so provided."0
III. POSSIBLE FUTURE MERGERS NOT OF THE CONVENTIONAL TYPE
The five cases discussed above involved certificated scheduled
carriers. The Allegheny-Mohawk case involved two subsidized carriers and each of the other cases involved two carriers not then
receiving subsidy. There may be other fact situations that will reach
the Board. Several such possibilities in alternative situations, which
widely differ with each other, are now discussed very briefly.
(A) A proposal may be made involving one subsidized (local
service) carrier and one non-subsidized (trunk) carrier. A trunk
carrier (assuming that it would be the surviving entity) would
probably find that the matter of Section 406"' payments would
be considered separately, after approval of a merger, just as was
done in the Hughes-Air West proceeding." Realistically, no future
subsidy payments could be expected. But several of the local service carriers now seem to be averting heavy losses, even in the
absence of subsidy;" and if a trunk carrier should want the certificate authority of one of the locals to mesh into its system, the
loss of Section 406 payments currently being received by the
smaller carrier would probably not offset the advantages the larger
carrier would expect to realize. Surely, the acquirers of Trans
Caribbean, Caribair and Northeast were faced with possible losses
of much greater size than the 406 payments being made to many
of the local service carriers.
(B) It is also possible that one of the certificated carriers would
seek a merger with a carrier operating under some intra-state certificate issued by a State regulatory agency and not certificated by
the CAB. It will be recalled that some four years ago, it appeared
that Pacific Southwest Airlines might seek Board certification in
0

Id. at 2-3.
"49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1970) (pertaining to payments to air carriers).
"See note 21 supra.
78 1972 CAB ANNUAL REPORT 104. In "before subsidy" figures, Piedmont and
Ozark showed an operating profit for FY 1972 and North Central showed a
relatively small loss. Allegheny showed a profit of more than $7.4 million before
the merger with Mohawk; and until a year's statistics are available after the
merger, it is not clear whether it will continue to show a "before subsidy" operating profit. Hence, of the remaining local service carriers, only Frontier, Hughes,
Southern and Texas International showed heavy "before subsidy" losses.
7
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order to commence operations into States other than California.
(C) Situations might arise similar to the TWA-Hilton situation,
not necessarily as a merger, but in the realm of interlocking relationships or acquisitions of control. Particularly in connection with
resort travel, potential airline passengers are desirous of having
assurances that they will be well cared for at their destinations, and
it is conceivable that other air carriers would seek to have some
financial ties with companies in the public accommodations business. It is realized that (in an industry other than the airline
industry) Boise Cascade has been less than pleased with its ventures into the resort business. Originally it had been thought that
travel to choice resort areas would stimulate house building, which,
in turn, would furnish a logical market for lumber. Despite the
Boise Cascade experience, some air carrier's affiliation with a hotel
or resort chain is still a distinct possibility during the rest of the
1970's.
(D) On another front, legislation was proposed in the NinetySecond Congress" which would have authorized the Board to permit an air carrier to hold both scheduled and supplemental certification. The bill, if passed, doubtless would have triggered some
preliminary negotiations as to mergers between one or more of the
scheduled carriers and one or more of the supplementals. That
proposal did not move forward in the Ninety-Second Congress,
but its sponsors indicate that the idea has not been abandoned.
Probably the most compelling reason for careful scrutiny of such
a proposal is that some foreign companies supposedly not affiliated
with each other, but actually under the same control, offer both
scheduled and charter services." The "get established" period for
74S. 2548, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). As neither this bill nor S. 2549, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), had, at the time of preparation of this article, been introduced in the Ninety-Third Congress, the references are to such bills introduced

by Senator Inouye, by request, on September 20, 1971.

5 Attached to statement presented on May 10, 1972, by Mr. Jerrold Scoutt,
Jr., Counsel for, and Director of, World Airways, Inc., to the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee, was an Appendix listing "Charter
Subsidiaries of Foreign Scheduled Carriers" as follows:
% OWNED BY
FOREIGN SCHEDULED
CARRIER

SUBSIDIARY

SCHEDULED CARRIER

Air France

Air Charter International

100%

Alitalia
Austrian Airlines
BEA

Societa Aerea Mediterranea
Austrian Airtransport
BEA Airtours Ltd.

100%
40%
100%
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the supplementals should be deemed to be at an end. The service
rendered by them to the public in focusing attention on what
could be done in the way of lower fares when charter flights were
well patronized is evident when the extensive bulk transportation
business now undertaken by the scheduled carriers under their
existing authority is examined.
If the Act were amended as proposed by S. 2548 the effect
would be to delete the portion of paragraph (3) of Section 401 (d)o
that states:
(3) In the case of an application for a
supplemental air transportation, the
tificate, to any applicant not holding
graph (1) or (2) of this subsection

certificate to engage in
Board may issue a cera certificate under para....

Under the proposed wording, the words "to any applicant not
holding a certificate under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection" would be deleted. The proponents of this suggested change
carefully point out that adoption of such a bill would not result in
Congressional approval of relationships between scheduled and
supplemental air carriers, but it would merely permit the possibility of such relationships, and leave the final determination to the
CAB.

(E) One other bill was introduced by Senator Inouye in
September 1971. This was S. 2549 which would have amended
Section 408 (b) of the Act. Comments on some of the provisions
Finnair
Iberia
Jugoslav Air
Transport
KLM
Lufthansa
Sabena
SAS
Swissair
UTA
Air Trans Africa
Balkan Bulgarian
Transport
Icelandic
Luxair
Out Island
Airways Ltd.
" See note 68, supra.

Kar-Air
Aviaco
Air Jugoslavia

29%
67 %
100%

Martins Air Charter
Condor
Sobelair
Scanair
Balair
Compagnie Aeroinaritime
d'Affretement
Afro-Continental Airways

25%
100 %
100%
100%
36 %

Bulair
Cargolux
Island Flying Services

NA
NA
NA
33%
33%
NA
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of that subsection were made above, in connection with the discussion of the American-Western case. Currently, there is a "provided further" sentence in 408(b) reading:
Providing further, That if the applicant is a carrier other than an
air carrier, or a person controlled by a carrier other than an air
carrier or affiliated therewith within the meaning of section 5(8)
of (the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended), such applicant
shall for the purposes of this section be considered an air carrier
and the Board shall not enter such an order of approval unless it
finds that the transaction proposed will promote the public interest
by enabling such carrier other than an air carrier to use aircraft
to public advantage in its operation and will not restrain competition:
The purpose of S. 2549 was to delete from 408(b) the portion
just quoted. It is interesting to note that some of the parties (from
the ranks of the supplemental carriers) supporting S. 2548 also
gave evidence in support of this bill." It is believed, however, that
the proposal contained in S.2549 has somewhat broader support
at this time-including some support at the Board. The decision
in the Long Haul Motor Carrier Control of Air Freight Forwarders Case"8 was an opening wedge into the area of intermodal
cooperation. Subsequently, the Joint DOT/NASA Civil Aviation
Research and Policy Development Study stated (in regard to
cargo) that:
The government should examine carefully its regulatory role in
several areas to be certain that regulatory policies are not inhibiting innovation by industry. One example of such a problem
is the current policy opposing multimodal mergers including air
carriers. This policy was originally established to protect civil
aviation from the then financially stronger ground modes, but
today it represents a barrier to reaiizing the full potential of air
cargo and impedes the incentive that R & D needed to improve
intermodal cargo shipment."
Advocates of the S. 2549 proposal are rather modest in their
statements as to how the Board would act on applications for
77Statement presented by World Airways, Inc., to the Aviation Subcommittee
of the Senate Commerce Committee on May 10, 1972.

7' Long Haul Motor Carrier Control of Air Freight Forwarders Case, CAB
Order No. 69-4-100 (1969).
7
9 DOT-NASA, REPORT ON CIVIL AVIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
POLICY STUDY (Mar. 1971) (number DOT TST-10-4, NASA SP-265).
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intermodal acquisitions. They foresee that the Board might proceed
as it did in the Freight Forwarder case," permitting monitored

entry into the field and retaining jurisdiction to keep a close tab
on intermodal companies.
Relaxation of the existing virtual prohibition against common
ownership of surface and air carriers would merely recognize the
relative economic parity between these arms of the transportation
industry today. In 1940, operating revenues for the air carriers

amounted to less than 212% of operating revenues for the railroads. 8' In the very near future, the operating revenues should be
about equal, because air carrier revenues have increased some
10,000 percent" while railroad revenues have increased about 150
percent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In an industry in which growth and progress come swiftly, a
"current" status report or analysis may become partially out-ofdate before it is printed and read. To a certain extent, the same
thing may be said with respect to an article pertaining to the
regulatory agency having jurisdiction over such an industry. During the 1960's, two excellent articles relating to CAB policies appeared in the Journal of Air Law and Commerce." In the earlier
of the two articles, annual operating revenues of the trunk airlines
were cited. For 1961, such revenues amounted to about $2 billion."
By 1972, total operating revenues of the trunk airlines (excluding
Pan American) had grown to more than $8,475,000,000.8 The
"See note 78, supra.
81See statement of World Airways, Inc., supra note 77, at 5.
CAB QUARTERLY INTERIM FINANCIAL REPORT (PRELIMINARY) (Dec. 1972),
prepared by the Bureau of Accounts and Statistics, Civil Aeronautics Board, shows
the calendar year 1972 total system operating revenues of the certificated carriers
to be:
Trunk and Pan American
$9,781.1 million
All cargo
291.3 million
Local service carriers
934.9 million
Total
$11,007.3 million
83 See statement of World Airways, Inc., supra note 77, at 5-6.
4Barber, Airline Mergers, Monopoly, and the CAB, 28 J. Am L. & COM. 189
(1961-62); Hall, The Civil Aeronautics Board Policy Favoring Subsidy Reduction
to Local Service Carriers:Its Role and Implementation in the Decisional Process,
34 J. Am L. & CoM. 566, 592-609 (1968).
85Barber, Airline Mergers, Monopoly, and the CAB, 28 J. AIR L. & COM. 189
(1961-62).
8
0 CAB QUARTERLY INTERIM FINANCIAL REPORT (PRELIMINARY) (Dec. 1972).
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subsidy article, published in 1968, preceded by a year or so, a
reversal of the subsidy reduction trend of the late 1960's.
In connection with this article, three events have occurred subsequent to its preparation, which deserve further comment, so that
the work will not be out-of-date from the inception. These three
matters are discussed as something of a postscript.
On April 11, 1973, the President disapproved the Board's
decision in the Eastern-Caribaircase, ' and accepted the recommendations of the Board's minority decision. The President directed
the Board to approve the acquisition subject to the restrictions on
the merged carrier's operating authority, as stated in the minority
opinion (with one exception)." Therefore, of the four "sick carrier" merger and acquisition cases of the early 1970's, the only one
in which the Board's majority did not approve the merger was
overturned by the President for foreign policy reasons-and (subject to some restrictions on operating authority) merger was approved in all cases.
Secondly, Vice Chairman Gillilland delivered an address in
Long Beach, California, on April 17, 1973, supporting the concepts embodied in S. 2548 and S. 2549, discussed above, stating:
Two statutory modifications would be helpful. One statute now in
effect prohibits the merger of companies engaged in different modes
of transportation. Another prohibits the merger of supplemental
air carriers with scheduled air carriers. Each statute was intended
to serve a worthy purpose and perhaps initially did so. The first
may have saved an infant air transportation industry from
strangling by the railroads. The second may have prevented a
similar fate to air charter transportation from a different predator.
Neither danger continues to exist. Neither restriction continues to
serve a useful purpose. On the contrary, each serves as an impediment to the normal flow of commerce and to the maximization
of sound economics in the use of the vehicles which transport it."
Finally, on the same day, Chairman Timm, in presenting the
"rCAB Docket No. 22690, (February 12, 1973) (disapproved, with directions,
by the President, April 11, 1973).
11The President directed that the Mainland-Ponce award to Eastern should be
deferred until April 1, 1975.
"1Remarks of Whitney Gilliland, Vice Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board at
Ceremonies Marking Deliveries of DC-10 Series 30 Convertible Freighter Aircraft to Overseas National Airways & Trans International Airlines, at 7-8, Long
Beach, California (April 17, 1973).
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Board's requests for fiscal 1974 appropriations to the Subcommittee
for Department of Transportation and Related Agencies of the
House Committee on Appropriations said:
The Board's number one priority, therefore, is to strengthen this
system. This will be done by taking actions, sometimes bold and
sometimes controversial, that will insure continuing progress. At
the Civil Aeronautics Board, this means we are going to have to
run to catch up with the people that we serve. We are going to
have to change an attitude of mind and realize that the airline
industry is no longer a growing child, but a mature adult. This
maturity, in some cases, requires a more restrained set of regulatory reflexes and responses and in other cases, more flexibility
than previously has been allowed.
What I am suggesting is that the airline industry should be afforded the same economic tools that other mature industries have,
including a healthy and nondestructive competitive climate; responsible mergers, acquisitions, and diversification. * * *

Air carrier diversification will be another area in which new
approaches will be considered during fiscal 1974. This is assured
because of the Air CarrierReorganization Investigation which is
currently in process at the Board. This investigation is a comprehensive examination that has as its chief objective a determination as to what further regulations and/or legislation may be in
the public interest to deal effectively with air carrier diversification.
The Board is entering into this proceeding with an open mind.
We have no preconceived notions of whether any particular type
of diversification, including the holding-company approach, is
either good or bad. Our intention is to rectify any deficiencies in
aviation legislation or regulation, if indeed any exist, to prevent a
reoccurrence of the Penn Central bankruptcy in the field of aviation."0

10 Statement of Chairman Robert D. Timm Before the Subcommittee for Department of Transportation and Related Agencies of the House Committee on
Appropriations, April 17, 1973.

